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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine a new survey of 6,oio U.S.householdsand esti-
mate a model for the allocation of total net worthamong different assets. The
paper has three main aims. The first is to investigate the extent to which a
conventional portfolio choice model can explain the differences inportfolio
composition among households. Our survey data show that most households hold
only a subset of the available assets. Hence we analyze a model in which
investors choose to hold incomplete portfolios. We show that theempirical spec-
ification of the joint discrete and continuous choice that characterizes house-
hold portfolio behavior is a switching regressions model with endogenous
switching.
The second aim is to examine the impact oftaxes on portfolio composition.
Thesurvey contains a great deal of information on taxable incomes and deduc-
tions which enable us to calculate rather precisely the marginal tax ratefacing each household.
The third aim is to estimate wealth elasticities of demand for arange of
assets and liabilities. We test the frequently made assumption of constant
relative risk aversion.
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Empirical studies of household savings behavior have focusedprimarily on
the total level of savings rather than itsallocation among different types of
assets. Although there is a substantial theoreticalliterature on portfolio
behavior, there are few empirical studies of thecomposition of household
portfolios using individual data and these studiesare rather dated. For
example, Bluine and Friend (1975), Feldstein (1976), andProjector and Weiss
(1966) used the 1962 Federal Reserve Boarddata, and Uhier and Cragg (1971) used
data from the 1960—62 Michigan Surveys of ConsumerFinances. In this paper, we
examine a new survey of 6,oio U.S. households andestimate a model for the
allocation of total net worth among different assets.
The paper has three main aims. The first is toinvestigate the extent to
which a conventional portfolio choice modelcan explain the differences in
portfolio composition among households. In the finance literaturethe model
has been tested using data on security prices ratherthan household asset
demands. Our survey data show that most households holdonly a subset of the
available assets. Hence we analyze a model in whichinvestors choose to hold
incomplete portfolios. We show that the empiricalspecification of the joint
discrete and continuous choice that characterizes householdportfolio behavior
is a switching regressions model withendogenous switching. This involves esti—
mating equations both for the probability of owning particularcombinations of—2--
assets (the discrete choice), and for the asset demand system conditional upon
ownership (the continuous choice).
Thesecond aim isto examine the impact of taxes on portfolio composition.
Thesurvey contains a great deal of information on taxable incomes and
deductionswhich enable us to calculate rather precisely the marginal tax rate
facing each household. Much of the current interest in tax reform, and the
debate over the merits of income or consumption as the personal tax base,
concerns the distortions created by the present tax system in the composition of
household savings. Proposalsfor reform often include the elimination of
deductions for a range of tax—sheltered investments. Yet there isvery little
empiricalevidence on the effect of taxes on portfolio composition; only
Feldstein(19T6)hasexamined this issue with U.S. data.
Thethird aim is toestimate wealth elasticities of demand for a range of
assets and liabilities. Although. mich attention has been paid to estimating the
demand for money, less effort has been devoted to estimating the demand for
other assets (primarily because of lack of data). An assumption frequently made
in some macroeconomic literature is that households exhibit constant relative
risk aversion. This implies unit wealth elasticities of demand. We test this
hypothesisbelow. A change in wealth alters both the number of households that
ownan asset and the demand for the asset conditional upon ownership. We shall
estimate wealth elasticities at both the intensive and extensive margins. We
shall also estimate an aggregate elasticity for the household sector as a whole,
andtest the hypothesis that the impact of a change in wealth depends upon how
that change is distributed among households. Because the financial structure of—3-.
the private sector's net worth is an important determinantof real decisions,
sich as corporate investment, the macroeconomicconsequences of a change in
total household net worth will dependupon the magnitude of the wealth elastici-
ties of demand for different assets. Although our resultsare based on micro—
data, they have macroeconomic implications.
In section 2, we describe the pattern of householdportfolio composition
that emerges from the survey and presentsome summary statistics. In section 3,
wederivea specification for the portfolio decision and discuss anappropriate
estimationprocedure. The estimation and results are described in section4.
Estimatesof the effects of taxes on portfolio compositionare presented in sec-
tion5andthe wealth elasticities in section 6.
2.Portfolio Composition of the Sample
Ourdata are taken from the 1978 Survey of Consumer FinancialDecisions
conducted by SRI International.The survey is a stratified random sample of
6,010 U.S. households. It includes detailed informationon household
characteristics, such as age,education,region and area of residence, marital
status and family composition, occupation,race, arid housing. It also includes
information on family income as well as portfoliocomposition and net worth.
The asset data refer to market values in May and June 1978and the income data
to the calendar year 1977. The survey heavilyoversampled high income families
and therefore provides a rich source of informationon household portfolio
behavior.l No fewer than 2,1430 households (140.14percent of the sample) reported
net worth in excess of $100,000 in 1978. The sample contains 2014millionaires
and the largest value of reported net worth is $73 million._14_.
The survey is remarkable for the information it provides on the asset
holdings of each of the 6,010 households. The dollar holdings of over one
hundred different specific assets and liabilities were recorded for each
household. These were grouped by SRI into 23 different assets and 13 types of
liability. Table 1 shows these 36 categories. They include different types of
bank and savings account, money market funds, bonds of various types, stocks,
mutual funds, convertible securities, owner—occupied housing, real estate and
other tangibles, IRA—Keogh accounts, tax shelters and life insurance.2 For
purposes of estimation, we have grouped these thirty—six categories into eleven
aggregate asset and liability classifications. These are shown as the main
headings in Table 1. The survey data exclude social security and certain types
of private pension wealth, ordinary consumer durables, and the expected value of
future inheritances.3 Table 1 also shows the percentage of the total net worth
of the sample that is held in each of the assets. Most of the wealth of
households is held in the form of homes, stocks, and investment real estate.
The implausibly low percentage accounted for by home mortgages is due to a high
degree of non—reporting ——closeto fifty percent ——ofthe value of first
mortgages on primary residences. This is analyzed further below.
Table 2 presents summarystatisticson the portfolio composition of
householdsin the sample. The mean level of net worth in 1978 was almost a
quarter of a million dollars. This oversampling of the rich is a great
advantage for the analysis of portfolio composition. Not surprisingly, certain
assetsare held by households with above average wealth levels, notably
corporate equity, bonds and "other assets" (tax shelters, etc.). Of the 6,oio—5—
households only 593 owned manicipal bonds but the mean net worth of this
group was almost a million dollars. The SRI survey is particularly well
suited to a study of the effects of taxes on householdportfolio behavior. It
provides a detailed account of the sources of income in each household and of
tax—deductible expenses. Twenty—two sources of income andtwenty—one types of
expense are distinguished. This information, combined with the demographic
data provided for each household and the specific informationon the household's
tax filing status, made it possible to derive accurate estimates ofthe marginal
tax rates faced by each household. We computed these tax ratesusing the TAXSIM
program developed at the National Bureau of Economic Research, which generated
tax liabilities for each household using both the federal and statetax code
relevant for the appropriate tax year. The information availableto construct
marginal tax rates is, to our knowledge, more detailed than that used inany
previous study of the incentive effects of taxation.
It is clear from rows 1 and 2 of Table 2 that most households owned
incomplete portfolios. In only two cases, checking accounts and liquidsavings,
was an asset held by more than 90 percent of the sample. At the other extreme
the proportions of the sample owning rminicipal bonds and taxablebonds were 9.9
and 10.5 percent respectively. Almost one—half of thesample owned corporate
equity and 81 percent were home—owners. In fact, for the complete classification
no household held more than 23 out of the possible 36 assets andliabilities,
and for the aggregated classification only O households helda complete
portfolio with all eleven assets and liabilities. The modal number of assets
owned was eight for the complete classification and seven for theaggregated—6—
classification,accounting for 12.0 and 19.6 percent of the sample respectively.
The median number owned was eight and six for the two classifications. Given
that the mean net worth of the sample was almost a quarter of a million dollars,
itis surprising that the number of assets held was so small. Itis important,
therefore,to take into account the phenomenon of incomplete ownership when
estimatingthe demand for individual assets; this problem is the focus of
section 3.
The survey providesindicators of ownership for each asset that are
independentof the dollar holdings reported. Some households do not report
dollarvalues for every asset they own and the existence of independent
responses indicating ownership and dollar holdings enables usto measure the
extent of this non—reporting (although not, of course, under—reporting). The
additional information allows us to obtain more efficient estimates by
exploiting techniques to deal with the problem of missing data. Of the6,010
households, 2,048 provided a complete set of dollar values or the assets that
they owned. In section )4 we describe how data for both the sample of2,048
households with complete responses and the full sample of 6,010 households may
be used in estimation. Although SRI used the ownership indicators to impute
values in cases of non—reporting, we were able to separate out the imputed
values and used only the rawdataactually reported by the survey respondents in
ouranalysis.
To test the qualityof the survey data, we compared the estimated
populationholdings for each asset (constructed byusing the grossing—up factors
describedin footnote 1) with the estimated aggregates shown in the year—end—7—
balancesheets published by the Federal Reserve. Thecomparison is of necessity
inexact. The two sources use different classificationsof assets and refer to
different dates in the year. Moreover, the FRB estimatesfor the household
sector are a residual in the balance sheet calculations. itwas possible to make
a direct comparison for seven of our eleven categories ofasset and liability,
and an approximate compaisoñ for theremaining assets. For most of the assets
the survey population totals are quite close tothe FRB figures. The largest
discrepancies were for taxable bonds and "other assets" wherethe survev data
were only one—half and two—thirds of the balance sheet totalsrespectively,5
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude from thesecomparisons that the
surveydataused here are worthy of study.
We turn now to the specification and estimationof a model of household
portfoliocomposition that allows for incomplete portfolios.
3.AModel of Incomplete Portfolios
It is clear from thesurvey data that most households own only a subset of
thepossible array of assets that they could hold, It istherefore necessary
to model both the probability ofownership of each asset and the demand for the
asset conditional upon ownership. The problems createdbyincompleteownership
aretwofold. First, the existence of zero holdings forsome assets will have
"spillover" effects on the demand for theremaining assets. Conditional upon
the values of observable characteristics, thedemand for an asset will depend
upon the particular combination of other assets in the portfolio,Second, there
is the more familiar problem that estimates basedon observations with positive—8—
holdingsof the asset are subject to sample selection bias. Previous empirical
studies of household portfolio behavior have not tackled these problems,
especially the first, satisfactorily. Ignoring such problems resultsin a
misspecification of the model and biased estimates of the parameters of
interest.
Previous theoretical discussions of incomplete portfolios have not analyzed
the Joint discrete and continuous choice of which combinations to own and, con-
ditionalupon ownership, what fraction of net worth to invest ineach asset.
Brennan (1975) and Goldsmith (1976) both analyze the optimal number of securi-
ties ina portfolio (taken to be a continuous variable) in the presence of tran-
sactions costs. Optimal asset demands for a given combination have been
examined by Levy (1978) and Mayshar (1981). Only Mayshar (1979) examines the
choice of which assets to own.
There are several reasons for the existence of incomplete portfoLios. Two
of the most important are the following. First, the existence of transactions
costs, interpreted broadly to include the "holding costs" in both money andtime
of monitoring and managing a portfolio, means that the optimal portfolio may
contain only a small number of assets. Second, it is possible that the
optimal portfolio may imply negative holdings of certain assets, and these may
be infeasible because of constraints on short sales (Auerbach and King 1983).
To prevent tax arbitrage, the revenue authorities adopt rules, such as the
asymmetric treatment of gains and losses and of interest receipts and interest
payments, that lead to nonlinear budget constraints. These constraints maybe
verysimilarin practice to non—negativity constraints on asset holdings. In—9—
other instances it may be very difficult or impossible tohold certain assets,
such as checking accounts, pension rights andhousing, in negative quantities.
We shall therefore examine the optimal portfolio ofa household with both
positive holding costs for each asset and non—negativityconstraints on asset
holdings 6
The specification we derive involvesestimating equations both for the
probability of ownership of an asset andalsofor its demand conditional upon
ownership.If the incompleteness of portfolios results from eitherthe
existence of holding costs or an optimizationproblem subject to non—negativity
constraints on holdings of individual assets, then the demandsystem is a
switchingregressions model with asmany regimes as there are distinct
combinationsof assets that may be owned. It is importantto note that the
extension of the univariate Tobit model to the multivariatecase does not
representthe behavior of an individual investoroptimizing subject to holding
costs or non—negativity constraints. This is demonstratedbelow.T The way in
which the asset demand function changesaccording to the regime is shown to be a
particular form ofstructural shift. These shiftsrepresent the "spillover"
effectsofthe absence of certain assets in the optimumportfolio on the demands
forthose assets that do appear.
Toexaminethe optimal portfolio we consideraninvestor whose
preferences can be represented by the followingutility function which is
assumed to be additively separable over time.—10—
V =Efu(c,t)dt
(3.1)
U is assumed to be a strictly concave function of a single consumption good, C,
and time (or age), denoted by t. T is either the investor's maximum life span
(uncertainty about date of death may be incorporated in the time—dependency
of U) or a longer planning horizon which allows for a bequest motive. The two




where N(t) is the number of units of asset jheldat time t
is the price of one unit of asset j at time t
Y(t) is the nonstochastic flow of labor income
c(t) is the consumption flow at time (t).
The budget constraint given by (3.3) embodies two strong assumptions.
First, the only source of uncertainty is assumed to be that concerning returns on
the J risky assets. Second, investors are assumed to be able to trade
continuously with no costs of buying or selling securities.8
1±' one further assumption is added, namely that asset prices follow a
continuous time Markov process and do not exhibit jumps, then investors choose
their current portfolio to maximize V subject to equations (3.2) and (3.3) as if
they were optimizing over the mean and variance of the portfolio giventhe level
of current wealth (Merton 1971, 1973, 1982). The stochastic process generating
asset prices is not required to be stationary, but it must change in a way that—11—
is either random or time—dependent in a nonstochastic manner.9 Withthis
assumption on the way in which exogenous shocks affect asset returns, wemay
analyze portfolio decisions as if investors maximized the following function
defined over the mean and variance of their portfolios
Fh =fh[11h(ah)21 (3.11)
subjectto the budget constraint
J Ii h h =W+b (3.)
where jidenotesthe meanreturnon the portfolio of household h, (ah)2 the
variance of the portfolio, e' the demand for asset j, net worth, and bh the
amount borrowed at the nonstochastjc interest rate R. For the momentwe shall
assume the existence of a riskiess asset and return later to a model with no
riskiess asset.
The mean return on the portfolio is
h h h h h = —Rb
(1_tb) (3.6)
h where is the mean pre—tax return per dollar invested in asset j,t is
Investor h's effective tax rate on the return from asset j, and t is the tax
rate against which interest payments may be deducted. An important determinant
of portfolio composition is the way in which effective tax ratesvary across
both assets and households.
Thevarianceof the portfolio is
(ah)2 = (3.7)
where C1 is the covariance of the per dollar returns on assets i and j. Short—12—
sales constraints will be assumed to exist for all risky assets
) 0 V j,h (3.8)
Maximizing (3.4) subject to (3.5)and(3.8) yields a set of first—order
conditions together with the complementary slackness conditions corresponding
to the non—negativity constraints.-° Once it is known which assets are owned in
positive amounts in the optimal portfolio then the first—order conditions can be
inverted to yield a conditional asset demand system.11 The values of asset
demands conditional upon the combination of assets that is owned is given by
b AhThV(ROh) (3.9)
where k denotes which of the possible (2J_1) combinations of positive asset
holdings characterize the optimal portfolio. The subscript k denotes that the
matrix or vector includes only those rows and columns of the original matrix
which correspond to the assets contained in combination IceAh isequal to the
inverse of the investor's degree of absolute risk aversion.12 V is the inverse
of the covariance matrix C, Th is a diagonal matrix with i/(i—t) as the
element of the leading diagonal, and 0h is a vector with element equal to
(l—t)/(l—t).
It is convenient to assume that the differences in the tax treatment of
assets can be captured by the following specification for the effective tax rate
on asset j
= j=l...J,b (3.10)
The value of th is the statutory marginal tax rate facing household h.—13—
Equation (3.10) encompasses most of the important differences in effective
tax rates across assets (for example, the tax—exempt nature ofpension funds and
the failure to tax the imputed income of home—owners).13 With thisassumption,
thedemand for asset j, conditional upon ownership, as aproportion of net worth
(denoted by p) maybewritten as
h=(Ah)(
1hickj -R(bh)}v (3.11) W l—5 t 1—ô.t
1




where rh is the degree of relative risk aversion and(kt) summarizes the way
in which demands depend upon the particular combination of assets in the
households portfolio. Risk aversion depends upon household wealth (human
and non—human), age and other observable characteristics. Weassume that
(3.13)
where is a vector of observable household characteristics (including net
worth), and c accounts for unobservable differences in risk aversion. The SRI
surveyasked households to describe their degree of aversion to risk ona scale
from one to five. The responses are used as an explanatory variable in the
estimation of the model discussed in Section .
Finally,we take a linear approximation of a and assume that1—l4—
a(k,t)=+ 1th (3.l1)





where ÷ and u = ÷n (where iirepresentsmeasurement and
optimization error) is assumed to be distributed N(O,2).
The demand system (3.15) is a switching regressions model with endogenous
switching. The advantage of deriving an explicit model is that the assumption
ofutility maximization restricts the structural shift between regimes to a
rather simple form. The intercept in (3.15) depends upon theparticularcom-
bination ofassets (other than I)thatare present in the household's portfolio.
Thefunctional formof (3.15) is independent of the regime and demands are a
linearfunction of the same set of explanatory variables in each regime with the
constant term varying according to the combinationof assets owned. This form
ofshift is easily modelled in terrns of dumnr variables, dk, denoting the corn—
J—1
binationof assets other than j in the portfolio.There are N =(2—1) such
combinations.Hence the equation which we shall estimate may bewritten as
in =k=ljkdk
+ ++ u j =i...j (3l6)
Equation (3.16) gives asset demands conditional upon ownership. To
determine which combination of assets a household owns it is not sufficient to
examine the first—order conditions. Rather, the levels of utility corresponding—15—
to each combination must be compared. This means that the household facesa
discrete choice problem with as many alternatives as there are distinct
combinationsof assets, which (ignoring the null portfolio) is 2i. For
combination k, define the maximum level of utility (as a function ofwealth, the
distribution of asset returns and other household characteristics) thatcan be
attained with that combination of assets as
hhh =v(x,t,€ =max
— I 1ctr
Theconditional demands that characterize the optimum at are given by (3.9).
The probability that combination k characterizes the optimum portfolio is thus
Pr(k) =Pr(V
=maxVt1; i = (3.18)
The structure of portfolios varies across households because of differences
in observable and unobservable household characteristics. The observables
include the tax rate, wealth and other socioeconomic characteristics recorded in
the survey. The unobservables include the differences in risk aversioncaptured
by h and differences in beliefs about the distribution of asset returns. In
this nxdel taxes and heterogeneous expectations play a crucial role inproducing
incomplete portfolios. With homogeneous beliefs about the distribution of asset
returns and in the absence of taxes, the constraints on short sales would never
be binding. The separation theorem implies that with a riskiess asset the two
mutual funds that span the set of available returns are the riskiess asset
itself and a risky portfolio. All investors own the same risky portfolio and
h h h2 f,(a)) (3.11)—16—
this can be chosen to be the market portfolio. Byconstruction it has positive
amounts of the risky assets. A portfolio optimumischaracterized by
non—negative holdings of the two mutual funds, and so no investor would wish to
sell short any of the risky assets.15 In the presence of taxes or of
heterogeneity in beliefs about the distribution of asset returns, investors
will no longer wish to hold the same risky portfolio, and there will be
opportunities for trade to exploit differences in tax rates (or beliefs).1G At
the optimum some investors may wish to engage in short sales. With constraints
on short sales the result will be that some, or more likely many, investors will
hold incomplete portfolios. Another factor leading to incomplete portfolios is
holding costs, and we analyze these below.
To model the household's discrete choice among the mutually
exclusive alternative portfolios would involve estimating the joint distribution
of the unobservables (differences in (i) risk aversion, (ii) beliefs about the
distribution of asset returns and (iii) holding costs), and would be
computationally infeasible given the number of alternatives and assets examined
here. We shall, therefore, estimate reduced form equations for the probability
of owning a particular combination of assets, and also for the probability of
owning a given asset j. The latter probability is given by
Pr(own j) =kiCk(1c)
(3.19)
We assume that the probabilities in (3.18) and (3.19) can be described as
if they were generated by a probit model, butweprovide no rigorous
justification for the implied assumption of normally distributed errors.
Estimates of probit models for (3.18) and (3.19) are described in Section 4.—11-.
One strong restriction implied by the model in (3.16) is that,the
coefficient vector of household characteristics, is thesame in all asset demand
equations. This implies that the wealth elasticities of conditional demandsare
the same for all risky assets. As we shall see in Section 6,the null
hypothesis that wealth elasticities are the same for all assets isrejected by
the data.
To generalize the model we relax two of theassumptions made above. The
first is the existence of a riskiess asset.1T Whenall assets are risky, the
wealth elasticities of conditional demandsvary across assets. This is because
theseparation theorem now implies that the two imxtualfunds that span the set
ofreturns both consist of particular combinations of risky assets. Weshall
regard (3.16) withreplacedby.asa linear approximation totheunderlying
demands i8
Thesecond assumption is that of zero holding costs of monitoring and
managing a portfolio. We can incorporate holding costs in the model in a
limited fashion. Suppose that such costs comprise twocomponents: a fixed
cost that is independent of the size of the holding and a variable costpropor-
tional to the amount owned. As far as the variable costs areconcerned, the
first—order conditions and the demand system (3.9) are unchanged with the
single exception that is now equal to (l—t)(1+c)/(i—t), wherec is
the variable holding cost per dollar for asset j. Assuming that investorsface
the same cost schedule the influence of the holding costs is absorbed intothe
coefficients of the ownership combination dumnr variables in (3.16). The fixed
costs have no effect on the conditional demand system, but both types of cost—18—
influence the decision as to which assets will appear in the optimal portfolio
and affect the coefficients of the reduced form probit models (3.18) and (3.19).
The existence of holding costs can, therefore, also lead to incomplete port-
folios with the conditional demand system given by (3.16). Transactions costs
of the more conventional kind defined over trades rather than the size of
holdings are equivalent to holding costs in a one—period model. In a continuous
time model, however, trading costs lead to infrequent revisions of the portfolio
and thus undermine the equivalence of the mean—variance model and the life—cycle
model with continuous trading.
ii.Econometric Estimation and Results
With either non—negativity constraints or holding costs of the type
analyzed above, the asset demand system conditional upon ownership is given by a
switching regressions model with as many regimes as there are distinct
combinations of assets. The way in which the demand system changes according to
the regime represents the "spillover" effects of the absence of certain assets
in the optimal portfolio on the demands for those assets that do appear. It
would be impossible to estimate separate functional forms for each regime
because with 2i regimes even a large data set such as that used here does
not provide adequate degrees of freedom. To derive a model for which estimation
is feasible we have tried to exploit the economic structure of the consumer's
programming problem. This led to a specification in which the shift in
functional form across regimes was rather straightforward in that only the
intercept varied with regime. The choice of the optimal combination of assets—19—
is made by a comparison of the utility levels associated with the
discrete alternative combinations. Empirically we shall ndel this choiceby
estimating reduced form probits for the probability of owning particular
combinations of assets,19
Several problems arise in the estimation of the demand system (3.16).
First, since the demand equation for each asset is estimated using observations
on only those households withpositiveholdings of the asset, there is potential
sample selection bias. To correct for this, we use a standard two—stageproce-
dure to yield consistent estimates. We first estimate reduced form probit
equations for the ownership probabilities of each asset and then include the
estimated hazard as an additional regressor in the demand system (Heckman 1976,
1979).20
Second, only a subset ofthe full sample, namely 2,0148households, reported
thevalue of holdings for each asset which they owned. Provided nonreporting is
eitherrandom or, more generally, "ignorable" (Griliches 1981), then estimation
on the sample of 2,018 households yields consistent estimates. Nonreporting is
"ignorable"if it is a function of the explanatory variables in (3.16) but riot
of the error termu. More efficient estimates can, however, be obtained by
using the information contained in the remaining observations. Nonreporting of
dollar values leads to the problem that reported wealth understates true net
worth if values of assets are not reported, and overstates it if liabilities are
not reported. Net worth isan important explanatory variable in the ide1, and
wewishto test the hypothesis that risk aversion, asgiven by (3.13), isa
functionof networth. Hence wemustallow for the effect of nonreporting in—20—
estimation. One approach would be to treat all instances of nonreporting as
missing observations on net worth and use existing nthods for dealing with
missing data (Dagenais 1973, Gourieroux and Monfort 1981, and Conniffe 1983).
This would, however, be very inefficient because nonreporting is usually of the
form where a household fails to report values for only one or two of its assets,
and reported net worth contains valuable information on holdings of other assets
which could be used in estimation. The values of net worth are incomplete
rather than missing. In the appendix therefore we describe a two—step methodS
for dealing with the problem of nonreporting and which exploits the information
contained in recorded net worth.
Third, because of the differential tax treatment of assets, the marginal
tax rate is endogenous to the choice of portfolio. Under a nonlinear tax sche-
dule, such as that in the U.S., a household's marginal tax rate depends upon the
composition of its portfolio. For example, a household can lower its marginal
tax rate for a given level of net worth by investing in rainicipal bonds rather
than taxable bonds. To deal with this we estimate (3.16) by instrumental
variables. FI estimation is infeasible here because of the number of dirnen—
sions (eleven assets) over which the nonlinear budget set is defined. We calcu-
late the marginal tax rate that each household would face at an exogenously
given hypothetical portfolio using the actual nonlinear tax schedule applicable
to the household. With this constructed tax rate as an instrument for the
actual marginal tax rate consistent estimates of the parameter vector nay be
obtained.21 To construct the exogenous portfolio we have assumed that households
hold all of their wealth in short-term government securities (3—month Treasury
Bills), the return on which is taxed as ordinary income.22—21--
Fourth, the theoretical specificationimplies that the intercept in (3.16)
consists of a sum of dunmtrvariables, each one corresponding to theownership of
a particular combination of assets otherthan that in the dependent variable.
In principle the required number ofduxnnr variables is 2J—l•1 (J is the nwnber
of assets), which for J =11is equal to 1,023. It wouldclearly be infeasible
to estimate a demand system with
that number of durnnr variables in each
equation. Moreover, some combinationsare not held by any household in the
sample, and hence some of the duinnr variables
would be prfectly collinear. We
have, therefore, aggregated the assets intofour groups for the purpose of
defining the ownership dunmr variables in (3.16).The four groups are (1)
checking accounts and liquid savings, (2)equity, municipal bonds, taxable bonds
and other assets, (3) homes, contractualand less liquid savings, and ()home
mortgages and other liabilities. The criterion forselecting the groups was
that the correlation coefficient between
the ownership dummies of any pair of
assets within a group be greater than 0.75 andthat between any pair of assets
in different groups be less than 0.75.This criterion was sufficient to deter-
mine both the number and composition ofour aggregate groups with one exception.
Membership of contractual savings schemes was morehighly correlated with posi-
tive holdings of liabilities than withholdings of assets, but we chose on a
priori grounds to group contractual savings with homesand less liquid savings
(which had correlation coefficients of 0.5kand 0.50 with membership of contrac-
tual savings schemes). Grouping assets in thisway means that in each of the
elevenconditional demand equations there are a n.ximum ofseven ownership dumnr
variables. In cases where the number of householdsowning a particular corn——22—
bination was very small (well below 1 percent of the sample) the dummy
corresponding to that combination was omitted to avoid problems of collinearity.
The ownership dummies used in each equation are shown in Table 14,
Fifth, the ownership combination dummy variables in (3.16) are endogenous.
The optimal portfolio choice determines both the combination of assetsthatare
owned and the demands conditional upon ownership. Hence the dummy variables
that enter into (3.16) are endogenous. Several estimation methods can be used
to obtain consistent estimates in the presence of endogenous dummy variables
(Heckman 1978, Dubin and McFadden 19814). We use the reduced form method in
which probit models are estimated for each ownership combination and then ordi-
nary least squares is applied to (3.16) with predicted probabilities replacing
the ownership combination dummies. Coefficient estimates of the asset demand
equations and heteroskedastic—consistent standard errors are shown in Table 14.
Theestimated reduced—form probit equations are shown in Table 3 and the
estimated asset demand equations in Table 4.Theexplanatory variables in the
probit equations include terms in total net worth, current employment income,
the marginal tax rate, the age of the head of household, marital status, occupa-
tion, education, employment status, and the subjective perception of aversion to
risk. The explanatory variables in the demand equations include all of these
variables plus the relevant set of dummy variables corresponding to the
ownership of different combinations of assets. Because the dependent variable
in the demand equations is the logarithm of the asset share, the adding up
constraint is not imposed on the model. One equation may therefore be regarded
as redundant.—23—
We focus on the estimated tax and wealth effects in sections 5and6,and
summarize briefly here the results for the other explanatory variables. Income
from employment has (as predicted by the model in which net worth is therele-
vant variable) little effect on asset ownership or demandsexcept for homes and
homemortgageswhere the consumption services provided are likely to becorre-
lated with employment income. Age is an important determinant ofownership.
The results in Table 1 reveal a pronounced quadratic relationship.23In the con-
ditional demand equations age effects are significant only for the firstfour
assets, where a quadratic relationship is again evident. The most significant
effect of marriage appears to be on the size of checking accounts. Theeffects
of occupation and, in particular, education suggest that information Costsmay
be an important determinant of portfolio behavior. Both occupation and educa-
tion significantly affect the probability of owningcorporateequities, taxable
bonds, rminicipal bonds, and "other assets," the four asset Categories for which
we would expect information costs to be highest. Consistent with this explana-
tion is the finding that neither education nor occupation play asignificant
role in the conditional demand equations. Being employed has a positive effect
on the probability of awning most assets (except for equity and bonds). It
appears, however, to have no effect on the level of conditional demands. Risk
averse households are more likely both to own and to invest a higher proportion
of net worth in contractual savings and taxable bonds. They investcorrespon—
dingly less in the more unusual and risky assets that are included in the
"other" assets and liabilities categories.
The coefficients on the ownership combination dummies would generally be
expected to be negative, either because the assets are substitutes or because214
the greater the number of assets in the portfolio the smaller is likely to be
the share of any one asset. Positive coefficients would arise when assets were
complements. Of the fifteen ownership combination coefficients that are signi—
ficant at the 5 percent level, eleven are negative and four are positive. In
the cases of positive coefficients the results suggest compleinentarily between
less liquid assets and ownership group 2 (equity and bonds), contractual savings
and group(liabilities),and between homes and group 2.
5.Effects of Taxes on Portfolio Composition
The way in which taxes affect portfolio choices has been at the center of
the recent debates about the merits of fundamental reform of the tax system.A
switch to either a comprehensive income tax or a consumption tax wouldeliminate
the differential tax treatment of assets and consequent distortionsassociated
with the current system. Very little empirical evidence has been broughtto
bear on this issue. The SRI survey is well suited to anexamination of the
problem because of the verydetailedinformation on the components of taxable
incomes and deductions recorded for each household (see section2 above).
In Table 5 are shown the marginal tax rates for those households owning
each of our eleven categories of assets and liabilities. Weshow both the
unweighted average for holders of each asset, and alsothe average marginal tax
rate weighted by households' shares of the total holdingsin the sample. Not
surprisingly, the weighted average marginal tax rates are higherthan the
unweighted means. For the sample as a whole the unweighted averagemarginal tax
rate is 2T.l percent in 1977 and the weighted (by sharesof net worth) average—25—
marginal tax rate is L2.7 percent. There are larger differences in marginal tax
rate among the holders of different types of asset. These areparticularly pro-
nounced for the weighted averages. For checking accounts, liquid and less
liquid savings, owner—occupied housing and home mortgages, the marginal tax
rates are noticeably less than the weightedaverage marginal tax rate for the
whole sample. The two highest marginal tax rates are for holdersof municipal
bonds (which are tax—exempt) and corporate equity, where theweighted averages
are 50.5 and 119.9 percent respectively.
There are two ways in which taxes affect portfolio composition. The first
is that differences in effective tax ratesamong assets and households may lead
to portfolio specialization in order that households can exploit theircom-
parative advantage in the production of post-tax income streams (Auerbach and
King 1983). Households with lower marginal tax rates will hold more of the
taxed securities, such as liquid and less liquid savings, and thosefacing
higher marginal tax rates will hold nre of the tax—privileged securities, such
as municipal bonds and equity. The second effect is that taxes alter the trade—
off between risk and return. The impact of this on the demands forrisky assets
is theoretically ambiguous (see Feldstein 1976 for asurvey of the literature).
The evidence from Table 5 bears out the predictions of the theory of com-
parative advantage. But this is not the whole story. Taxable bonds, for
instance, are owned by households with very high marginal tax rates which
contradicts the pure comparative advantage model. Moreover, Tables 3 and J4 show
rather mixed results. The ownership probabilities are generally positively
related to the tax rate which suggests that taxes increase the demand forrisky—26—
assets. But in Tablethe tax rate coefficients are insignificantly different
from zero in most cases.
One potential difficulty with the estimated tax coefficients is the identi-
fication problem associated with including both the tax rate and current income
as explanatory variables. The tax rate is a known nonlinear transformation of
income and other exogenous variables, and if the way in which income enters into
the true behavioral model is unknown the separate effects of the tax rate
cannot be identified. This problem is likely to be less irnportant for our data
set than in many other cases because (a) we include employment income not
taxable income in the model, and (b) we are able to construct accurate estimates
of taxable income. The correlation coefficient between the marginal tax rate
and employment income was only 0.53,andthat between the tax rate and the
logarithm of net worth was 0.37. Moreover, it is wealth rather thancurrent
income that should be the forcing variable behind portfolio allocation, and so
the potential identification problem is unlikely to be serious.
It appears that tax rates are more important in determining the probability
ofownership of an asset than its share in net worth conditional uponownership.
Itis perhaps surprising that our econometricestimates do not corroborate the
clienteleeffects apparent from Table 5. The failure of our estimation proce-
dure, using a seemingly accurate measure of the marginaltax rate, to identify
more pronounced tax effects suggests, contrary toraich of the recent literature,
that taxes donot play a decisive role in explaining the differencesin port-
folio composition across households.—27—
6.Wealth Elasticities
The model estimated above allows us to calculate the wealth elasticities of
demand for each asset, at both the intensive and extensive margins, asa
function of the estimated coefficients and values of the exogenous 'v.riables. A
change in wealth has two effects. First, it alters the probability that a
household owns an asset. Secondly, conditional upon ownership it changes the
demand for each asset. The expected demand for an asset is the product of the
ownership probability, ¶andthe conditional demand, e,, and we define the
J
total wealth elasticity as the elasticity of the expected demand with respect to




This expression may be written as the sum of the intensive and extensive
elasticities
E=f- E+E (6.2)




11 = ff(u)du (6.3)
j-
wheref( ) is the standard normal density, Z is the vector of values of the
explanatory variables included in the probit model, and the vector of
coefficients for which our estimates are given in Table 3. The specification





Hence the wealth elasticity of the ownership probability is
0=+ 2.inw)h
(6.5)
where h is the value of the hazard function for asset j (the ratio of the
density of 1' to the ownership probability for asset j) anddependsupon house-.
hold characteristics, including wealth.2'
The asset demand equations shown in Table ) also include in w and(inw)2
as explanatory variables and if their coefficients are denoted by cx1 and
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This expression shows that the estimated model allows a reasonably flexible
specification for the wealth elasticities. They depend upon the level of wealth
itself both directly (though the linear dependence on in w) and indirectly
through the value of the hazard h. Household characteristics other than wealth
enter via their influence on the hazard. Because the hazard appears in (6.7),
the wealth elasticity is a nonlinear function of the estimated parameters. If
all four of the wealth coefficients are zero then the wealth elasticity is
unity. This is useful because a natural null hypothesis to test is that the
wealth elasticity is equal to unity. If household preference orderings exhibit
constant relative risk aversion then the wealth elasticities of all assets will—29—
beequal to unity. It is clear, however, that the hypothesisof constant rela-
tive risk aversion is strongly rejected by the data, contraryto the findings of
BlumeandFriend (1975). Only in the case of taxable bonds are allfour of the
estimatedwealth coefficients insignificantly different from zero atthe 1 per-
cent level. One caveat to this conclusion is that neither we norBlume and
Friend included social security wealth in the measure of networth. Given the
high wealth levels of our sample this may not be of great importance.An addi
tional caveat is that we ignore the possibility thathouseholds see through the
"institutional veil," and condition their portfolios on theassets in which
their defined contribution pension plans and IRA/Keoghaccounts are invested.
For the conditional demand equations Table6 shows the value of the chi—
square statistic to test the null hypothesisthat the coefficients on both
wealthterms are zero. Thecritical values of chi—square with two degrees of
freedom are 5.1 at the 5 percentlevel and 9.21 at the 1 percent level. The
hypothesisof constant relative risk aversion can be rejectedfor all assets
except equity and bonds at the 1 percentlevel.25
Table 7 presents point estimates of the ownership,demand, and total wealth
elasticities for each asset evaluated for two representativehouseholds. The
first is a household with wealth equal to theestimated population mean net
worth of $57,14O8, and the second is one withwealth equal to the sample mean net
worth of $223,188.26 In both cases the households areassumed to have values of
other household characteristics equal to the samplemean. The ownership elasti-
cities are small for most assets but for corporateequity, taxable bonds, mini—
cipal bonds and other assets, an increasein wealth has a sizeable positive—30—
impact on the probability of ownership. InFigure1 we plot the predicted
ownership probabilities as a function of wealth implied by the probit estimates
reported inTable 3. The probabilities are evaluated at sample means for all
household characteristics other than wealth. The plots show clearly that the
relationship between ownership and wealth differs across assets. Of particular
interest are the sigmoid—shaped curves for equity and "other assets."
The demand elasticities also vary significantly across assets. At the
sample mean level of net worth the demand elasticities for equity and municipal
bonds are very close to unity. For checking accounts (a large component of
money demand) and liquid savings the elasticities are around one—half, in
contrast to the presumption in much of the macroeconomic literature that they
are close to zero. The elasticity for contractual savings is alsoaroundone—
half and that for housing about one—third. The only negative elasticity is that
for taxable bonds and here none of the estimated wealth coefficients were signi-
ficantly different from zero. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the largest
total elasticities are for municipal bonds, corporate equity and other assets,
and at the sample mean value for net worth all three exceed unity.
For both types of liability the elasticities are less than unity. From
this and the balance sheet constraint that net worth equals assets minus liabi-
lities we may deduce that the wealth elasticity of the nine assets taken as a
group is less than unity. Both assets and liabilities are measured as positive
amounts. Let A denote total assets, L denotes total liabilities, EA and the
wealth elasticities of assets and liabilities (averages of the individual asset
and liability elasticities weighted by the shares of each asset (liability) in
total assets (liabilities)). Then the condition that W =A-Limplies that—31--
EA =EL(14)
+ (6.8)
Since 0W/A1, if both liability elasticities are less than unity, then
EL <1and by (6.8) EA <1.It is not surprising, therefore, that for most of
the assets the elasticities in Table 7 are less than unity.21
Because the magnitude of the wealth elasticities depends upon wealth and
other household characteristics, the aggregate effect of a change in wealth
depends upon how that change is distributed among the population. Table 7 shows
that the elasticities are different for households with different levels of net
worth.28 In Table 8 we show theaggregate wealth elasticity for each asset under
the assumption that the proportionate change in wealth is uniformamong the
sample. The predicted aggregate demand for asset j is
aj =hjeJ (0.9)






is the predicted share of household hts demand for asset j in the
aggregate demand for the asset The first three columns of
Table 8 show the aggregate ownership, demand and total elasticities for the full
sample of households with positive net worth. For those households which did
not report the dollar values of all asset holdings, the predicted level of net
worth (as described in the discussion of missing data in Section 1) was used to
calculate the elasticities.
The broad pattern of elasticities shown in Table 7 holds also for the
aggregate elasticities in Table 8. Taking into account the variation in wealthand othercharacteristics among the sample leads to somewhat larger elasticities
for equity, "other assets," and liabilities other than mortgages. Because the
sample is drawn heavily from upper-income groups, we calculate also aggregate
elasticities for the population as a whole where the individual elasticities are
weighted not only by predicted asset shares but also by population weights. The
populationestimates of the aggregate elasticities are displayed in the final
three columns of Table 8.Theseare our best estimates oftheelasticities
relevant for macroeconomic behavior. The largest elasticity is for municipal
bonds, followed by equity and other assets. The smallest elasticities are for
owner—occupied housing, home mortgages and less liquid savings.
7.Conclusions
Examining the pattern of household portfolio composition that emergesfrom
a new survey of 6,010 U.S. households, we have foundthat the vast majority of
households hold only a subset of the available assets. This has implications
for both the theoretical modelling of portfolio behavior and theeconometric
estimation of asset demand equations that have not been dealt with satisfac-
torily in earlier studies. We have shown that if the incomplete portfoliosare
the result of an optimization subject to holding costs and constraints onshort
salesthen the asset demand system is a switching regressions model with as many
regimes as there are distinct possible portfolios. The specificationwe derived
involved equations both for the probability of owning each assetand combination
ofassets and for the asset demand system conditional upon ownership.An esti-
mation procedure was developed to respond to the problems caused by incomplete—33—
portfolios, non—reporting of dollar holdings, and the endogeneity of the tax
rate and of the portfolio composition dummies.
We have used this model to examine the impact of taxes on portfolio com-
position. The information provided by the survey on taxable incomes and deduc-
tions has enabled us to calculate the marginal tax rate facing each household.
Ourresults show that tax rates are a significant determinant of asset ownership
but, surprisingly, not of the share of net worth invested in the asset. Though
far from conclusive, this finding suggests that themagnitude of the distortion
inducedby capital taxation on household portfolio choices may be less than pre-
viously thought.
Wehave estimated wealth elasticities of demand for a range of assets and
liabilities at both the intensive andextensive margins. The presumption that
the wealth elasticity of demand for moneyis zero and that for other assets is
unitywas shown to be unjustified. For corporate equity, municipal bonds and
"other assets," the estimated wealth elasticities were greater than unity.
Other assets, such as wealth in contractual savings schemes and short—term
financial assets, had elasticities of around one—half. These estimates suggest
that changes in total household net worth will change the structure of household
balance sheets and consequently affect real decisions, such as corporate invest—
ment, in the economy.
Finally, this study suggests that the differences in portfolio composition
across households cannot be fully explained within the framework of the conven-
tional portfolio choice model. The households in our sample, though wealthy,
own a surprisingly small number of assets and liabilities and this lack ofdiversification was found to be important when estimating asset demand
equations. Given that the mean net worth of the sample was almost a quarter of
amillion dollars in1978,itis bard,toimaginethat transactions costs, as
traditionally defined, played a decisive role in producingincomplete port-
folios.
Onealternative explanation is that some assets produce joint products.
For example, housing produces both a stream of returns on the investment and a
consumption flow of housing services. Other assets may be held as part of a
labor contract, either on the part of senior managers or in own businesses, in
which case the desire to diversify portfolio risks may be constrained by
contracts that preserve incentives for managers. Still others may offer
liquidity, as in the case of checking accounts or liquid savings, or insurance,
as in the case of contractual savings. The joint nature of the services pro-
vided by some assets means that the separation of the optimal consumption plan
and the optimal portfolio allocation no longer holds. Differences in consump-
tion patterns across households could therefore lead to incomplete portfolios.
A second and more compelling explanation of this phenomenon is the
existence of significant holding costs in the management of a portfolio that
increase with the number of assets owned. In particular, our results suggest
that a major factor affecting household portfolio behavior may be the costsof
acquiring and processing the information required to make decisionsabout how
best to allocate resources across different assets. We would expect such costs
to vary among households and, in particular, with observable variablessuch as
the level of educational attainment and occupation. Our results show thatedu——35—
cation and occupation are importantdeterminants of the ownership decision for
corporate equities, taxable bonds, .inicipalbonds, and"otherassets"——the four
types of assets for which we wouldexpect information costs to be highest. The
existence of such household_specific
information costs casts doubt on the tradj—
tiQnal assumption of homogeneousexpectations and suggests the need for greater
attentior in both theoretical and
empirical work on portfolio behavior to the
process and costs of acquiring information.—36—
Appendix
We describe here a two—step procedure for dealing with the problem of
nonreportirig of asset values. At the first stage we estimate an equation for
the logarithm of net worth as a function of exogenous and observable household
characteristics using data for the sample of 2048 households which report values
for all assets owned.
lnW=Xb+e (A.l)
Asexplanatory variables we include a piece—wise linear f'.inction of age
(using the method proposed in King and Dicks—Mireaux 1982), income from
employment,marital status, education, occupation, household composition,
religion, pension status, and a farm family dummy. The sampleselection bias
induced by using only observations with positive values of net worth was
corrected by a standard two—step procedure (Heckman 1976, 19T9). The parameter
estimates, b, can be used to construct estimates of the logarithmof net worth
forhouseholds with incomplete responses. In fact, if we stopped at thispoint
andused Xb as an estimate of in w in (3.16) for nonreporting households, then
thisprocedure would be equivalent to a Dageriais estimator forthe missing data
problem (Dagenais 19T3). But because net worth is not missingbut only
incompletely recorded we use a second step which improves efficiency.We assume
that we nay approximate the relationship between recorded and true networth




=1if asset j is owned and value of holding is not reported—37—
=0otherwise.
We obtain estimates of the coefficientsa by regressing(in WR —Xb)
the nonreporting dummies using observations on households where the value
of at least one holding is not reported ((A.2) holds exactly for households
which report all holdings). Our estimate of net worth for households with
incomplete reporting is given by
/ RJ lnw) =lnW +E—a
i—i j U
Ifnonreporting is t'ignorabiet' (Griiic'ries 198)4), then the norreporting
dumrvariables are exogenous and (A.2) can be estimated by OLS. Where this
condition is not satisfied instrumental variables estimation can be employed.
In the estimation of both the reduced form probits and the asset demand system
(3.16), we use predicted et worth as given by (A.3).—38—
Footnotes
1.The sample has two parts. The "NFO" file consists of 3,801 households with
incomes of less than $30,000. The "Gallup" file consists of 2,206 households
with incomes of $30,000 or more.Weightingfactors for each household are
provided on the tape that allow us to gross—up sample totals to provide
population estimates.
2.The recorded data on the value of partnerships and unquoted businesses of
whichthe household was the principal owner were imputed using sales figures.
Because of the arbitrary nature of the imputation we excluded "own business
value" from our analysis.
3.Durables such as boats, planes, works ofart, etc. are included in the
category"other assets".
4.Fora description of TAXSIM see Feldsteinand Frisch (1977) and Feenberg
and Rosen (1983).
5.A detailed discussion of the comparison of the two sets of estimates for
personal sector asset holdings may be found in King and Leape (l98).
6.A further reason might be the existence of a number of "mutual funds" (less
than the number of assets and liabilities distinguished in our survey) which in
themselves are sufficient for a portfolio optimum. Given the nature of the
eleven assets and liabilities used in this study (see Table 1) the existence of
such mutual funds is improbable. The number of funds that would be required
depends upon the stochastic process generating asset returns.
7.For further discussion of this point see King (1981).—39—
8.It is important to distinguish betweentransactions costs of trades and
"holding costs" of different assets. Thelatter are discussed below; the former
we shall ignore.
9. If preferences are restrictedsuch that U belongs to the HARA(hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion) class, thenthe one—period portfolio problem equivalence
result holds for a more general
nonstationary stochastic process (Merton 1911).
10. The second—order conditions willbe satisfied if is a concave function
of the equity holdings and a suitableconstraint qualification holds.
11. This model and its relationship to the econometricliterature on
inultivariate tobit and related models is discussed in more detail inKing
(l981).
12. In the continuous time model underlying (3.14), A11 isequivalent to the
inverse of the degree of absolute risk aversion of the derivedutility of wealth
function. This function is defined below in (3.11).
13. One exception is that the effective tax rateon equity, which depends upon
the treatment of capital gains, varies with thefrequency of trading because the
tax is based on realizations. The tradingfrequency nay, in turn, be a function
of household characteristics.
i14. We ignore here the effect of the combinationof assets owned on the coef-
ficient of the tax rate in order to reduce the prDblems ofcollinearity
discussed in Section 14.
15. We assume that none of the risky assetsare redundant in the sense that its
returns are a linear combination of the returnson other assets.
16. See also Tobin's (1958)earlydiscussion of the effect of taxes onoptimal—li.O —
portfolios.
iT. Bodie (1982) has argued that short—term Treasury Bills are reasonably close
to a riskiess investment.
18. This is not entirely satisfactory because when all assets are risky the
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logarithmictransformation of' the dependent variable was made to reduce the
otherwise severe heteroskedasticity. The influence of the combination of assets
owned was limited to the constant term as in (3.16)to redace to manageable
proportionsthe number of coefficients to be estimated.
19. For a very small number of assets the likelihood function corresponding to
the Kuhn—Tucker conditions for the investor's programming problem can be
evaluated using approximations to the imiltivar.iate normal distribution (Wales
and Woodland, 1983). But for the number of assets which it is economically
interesting to examine this approach is infeasible.
20.The theoretical model implies that the function of observable
characteristicswhich determineswhether a household owns an asset isnot the
sameas the function which describes demands conditional upon ownership. Hence
weestimate a probit ownership model and demand system separately rather than a
tobitmodel. Because we provide no rigorous justification for the probit speci-
fication, the assumption of joint normality of the errors in the ownership and
conditional demand equations mast be regarded as a maintained hypothesis.21. The nonlinearity of the tax schedule means that the instrument is a
nonlinear function of the exogenous variables. In this case instrumental
variables estimation is not equivalent to two—stage least squares. For further
discussion of estimation with nonlinear budget constraints see Hausman (1981,
1982).
22. The interest rate was taken to be the mean of the quarterly rates for 1977
published in The Federal Reserve Bulletin, a figure of 5.27 percent per annum.
23. Life cycle aspects of portfolio composition are discussed further in King
and Leape (198k).
214. For the probit model where f( )isthe standard normal density the hazard
is equal to the inverse of Mills' ratio.
25. We do not present a test statistic for the asset demand system as a whole
because the number of observations used in estimation varied across assets.
26. The population mean value of net worth was estimated using the sample
weights described in fn. 1.
27. Because we are using cross—section data, we are unable to distinguish bet—
veen permanent and transitory shocks to wealth which, in the presence of coriven—
tional transactions costs, would have different effects on asset demands.
Transactions costs are, however, unlikely to be of major importance for wealthy
households such as those in oursample.
28. The condition that the aggregate wealth elasticity is independent of the
distribution of wealth is a== 2j=0.Only in the case of taxable
bonds would this null hypothesis fail to be rejected at the 1 percent level.—
References
Auerbach, A.J. and M.A. King (1983), "Taxation, Portfolio Choice and Debt—Equity
Ratios: A General Equilibrium Model," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98,
587609.
IBlume,M.E. and I. Friend (1975),"TheAsset Structure of Individual Portfolios
and Some Implications for Utility Functions," Journal of Finance 30,
585-603.
Bodie, Z. (1982),"investmentStrate in an inflationary Environment," in
(ed.) B.M. Friedman, The Changing Roles of Debt and Equity in Financing
U.S. Capital Formation, University of Chicago Press.
Brennan, M.J. (1975), "The Optimal Number of Securities in a Risky Asset
Portfolio When There are Fixed Costs of Transacting: Theory and Some
Empirical Results," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 10,
183_196.
Conniffe, D. (1983), "Small—Sample Properties of Estimators of Regression
Coefficients Given a Common Pattern of Missing Data," Review of Economic
Studies 50, 111—120.
Dagenais, M.G. (1973), "The Use of Incomplete Observations in Multiple
Regression Analysis," Journal of Econometrics 1, 317—318.
Dubin, J.A. and McFadden, D.L. (1981k), "An Econometric Analysis of Residential
Electric Appliance Holdings and Consumption," Econometrica 52, 345.-362.
Feenberg, D.R. and Rosen, H.S. (1983), "Alternative Tax Treatments of the
Family: Simulation Methodo1o,r and Results," in (ed.) M.S. Feldstein,_)4 3—
BehavioralSimulation Methods in Tax Policy Analysis, University of
Chicago Press.
Feldstein, M.S. (1976), "Personal Taxation and Portfolio Composition: An
Econometric Analysis," Econometrica 631—650.
_________andD. Frisch (1977), "Corporate Tax Integration: Estimated Effects
on Capital Accumulation," National Tax Journal 30, 37—51.
Goldsmith, D. (1976), "Transactions Costs and the Theory of Portfolio
Selection," Journal of Finance 31, 1127—1139.
Gourieroux, C. and A. Monfort (1981), "On the Problem of Missing Data in Linear
Models," Review of Economic Studies )43, 4T9—586.
Griliches,Z.(l98L), "Data Problems in Econometrics," mimeo.
Hausrnan,J.A. (1981), "The Effect of Taxes on LaborSupply," in (eds.) H. Aaron
andJ. Pechman, How TaxesAffect Economic Behavior, Brookings Institution,
Wash ingt on.
__________(1982),"The Econometrics of Non—Linear Budget Sets," mimeo, MIT.
Heckman, J.J. (1976), "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation,
Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator
for Such Models," Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5, 175492.
_________(1978),"Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation
System," Econometrica 16,931—959.
__________(1979),"Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,"
Econometrica17,153—162.
King,M.A. (198L), "The Structure of Discrete and Continuous Choices: Modelling
Asset Demands," mimeo.
and L—D.L. Dicks—Mireaux (1982), "Asset Holdings and the Life Cycle,t'—1j4—
EconomicJournal 92, pp. 2.VT—267.
_________andJ.I. Leape (1981k), "Household Portfolio Composition and the
Life Cycle," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper.
Levy,H.(1978), "Equilibrium in an Imperfect Market: A Constraint on the
NumberofSecurities in the Portfolio," AmericanEconomic Review 68,
63—658.
Mayshar,J. (1979), "Transactions Costs ina Model ofCapital Market
Equilibrium,"Journal of Political Economy 87, 673—700.
_________(1981),"Transactions Costs and the Pricing of Assets," Journal of
Finance 36, 583—597.
Merton, R.C. (1971), "Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous—
Time Model," Journal of Economic Theory 3, 373_113.
__________(1973),"An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model," Econometrica
Iii, 867—887.
_________(1982),"On the Microeconomic Theory of Investment Under
Uncertainty," in (eds.) K.J. Arrow and M.D. Intriligator, Handbook of
Mathematical Economics, Vol. 2, North—Holland, Amsterdam.
Projector, D.S. and G.S. Weiss (1966), Survey of Financial Characteristics of
Consumers, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.
Tobin, J. (1958),"LiquidityPreference as Behavior Towards Risk," Review of
Economic Studies 26, 65—86.
Uhler, R.S. and J.G. Cragg (1971), "The Structure of the Asset Portfolios of
Households," Review of Economic Studies 38, 31-1_357.
Wales, T.J. and A.D. Woodland (1983), "Estimation of Consumer Demand Systems— 5—
withBinding Non—Negativity Constraints," Journal of Ecpnometrics 21,
263—285.Table 1: Asset Classifications
Mean Asset Percentage of
Holding Total Wealth
(in dollars)
I. CHECKING ACCOUNTS 2,1419 1.1
1. Checking accounts 2,1419 1.1
II. LIQUID SAVINGS 11,236 5.0
2. Savings accounts 10,336 14.6
3. Credit union share accounts 835 0.14
14.Moneymarket funds 65 0.0
III. LESS LIQUID SAVINGS 8,520 3.9
5. Savings certificates 6,589 3.0
6. U.S. Savings Bonds 913 0.14
7. Money market instruments 1,018 0.5
IV. CONTRACTUAL SAVINGS 114,1459 6.5
8. Pension or retirement 10,1485 14.7
plan account
9. Single—premium annuities 811 Q•14
(excluding IRA's)
10. Cash value of life insurance 3,163 i.14
V. EQUITY 52,102 23.3
11. Stocks 149,833 22.3
12. Stock mutual funds 2,269 1.0
VI. TAXABLE BONDS 5,217 2.14
13. Corporate bonds 3,059 1.14
114. Federal government bonds 2,158 1.0
VII. MUNICIPAL BONDS 6,860 3.1
15. Municipal bonds 6,860 3.1
VIII. HOMES 714,3142 33.3
16. Value of primary residence 70,293 31.5
17. Value of secondary residence 14,0149 1.8Table 1, continued
Mean Asset Percentage of
Holding Total Wealth
(in dollars)
IX.OTHER ASSETS 86,087 38.6
18. Tax shelters 1,910 0.9
and equipment leases
19. Closely—held stock 19,020 8.5
20. Convertible securities, 9,452 4.2
REITS, boats, andplanes
21. Investment real estate 49,982 22.11
22. Tangibles 4,022 1.8
(marketable art, gold, etc.)
23. Other assets i,70i 0.8
X.HOME MORTGAGES 18,529 8.3
24.First mortgage 8,281 3.7
on primary residence
25. Second mortgage 257 0.1
on primary residence
26. Mortgage on second home 869 0.4
27. Home improvement loan 9,122 11.1
XI.OTHER LIABILITIES 19,521.1 8.7
28. Personal loans 1,813 0.8
29. Cash value loans 956 O4
30. Revolving bank card account 564 0.3
Liabilities against:
31. Tax shelters 456 0.2
32. Closely—held stock 1,549 0.7
33. Convertible securities, 306 0.1
REITS, boats andplanes
34. Investment real estate 13,700 6.1
35. Tangfbles 20 0.0
36. Otherassets 160 0.1
NET WORTH 223,188 100.0



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Checking Accounts 5558 27.8 35.0
2. Liquid Savings 5138 28.1 35.1
3. Less Liquid Savings 3255 28.1 32.3
. ContractualSavings L596 29.9 39.8
5. Corporate Equity 2915 32.7
6. TaxableBonds 632 36.1 145.9
7. Municipal Bonds 593 31.5 50.5
8. Owner—Occupied Housing 5051 28.4 34.8
9. OtherAssets 2610 33.6 145.6
10. Home Mortgages 33141 31.14 33.1
11. Other Liabiities 37114 30.1 145.1
Total Net Worth 6010 27'.l 142.7
Note: The weighted average marginal tax rates are weighted by the household's
share of the total holdings of the asset in the sample.
Source: Own calculations based on SRI survey.Table 6: Test Statistic for Constant Relative Risk Aversion
Chi—Square Asset Statistic
1. Checking Account 109.00
2. Liquid Savings 83.10
3. Less Liquid Savings 35.58
..ContractualSavings
5. Equity 8.12
6. Taxable Bonds 3.98
7. Municipal Bonds 0.60
8. Home 929.56
9. Other Assets 19.L6
10. Home Mortgages 256.22
11. Other Liabiities 6.2O
Source: Owncalculations.Table 7: Wealth Elasticities for Two Representative Households
PredictedElasticity Predicted Elasticity
Evaluated at the Population Evaluated at the Sample
Mean Wealth
Asset Ownership
of $57,1408 Mean Wealth of $223,188
OwnershipDemand Total Demand Total
Checking
Account .001 .5141 .5142 —.003 .555 .552
Liquid
Savings .006 .5014 .510 —.007 .5014 .1498
Less Liquid
Savings .087 —.063 .025 .0149 .157 .206
Cractual
Savings .0146 .1481 .527 .023 .1493 .516
Equity .323 .778 1.101 .1412 .999 1.1411
Taxable
Bonds .605 —.250 .355 .673 —.2142 .1431
Municipal
Bonds .589 .789 1.378 .7146 .939 1.685
Owne r—oc cu—
pied Housing .138 .351 .1489 .108 .312 .1420
Other
Assets .338 .5140 .908 .1421 .8614 1.285
Home
Mortgages .067 —.019 .0148 —.013 .029 —.0143
Other
Liabilities —.0114 .377 .363 —.032 .7014 .672
Note: Totals ay not equal sum of components because of rounding errors.
Source: Own calculations.Table 8: AggregateWealth Elasticities
Note: Totals may not equal sum of components because of rounding errors.
Source: Own calculations.
Sample Population
OwnershipDemandTotal Ownership DemandTotal Asset
Checking
Account —.002 .570 .568 .000 .5314 •5314
Liquid
Savings —.006 .508 .502 .002 .505 .507
Less Liquid
Savings .263 —.179 .083 .252 —.231 .021
Contractual
Savings .008 .5014 .512 .023 .1495 .518
Equity .038 1.5141 1.579 .200 1.120 1.320
Taxable
Bonds .71.8 —.307 .1411 .7149 —.309 .14141
Municipal
Bonds .378 1.172 1.550 .558 1.025 1.5814
Owner—occupied
Housing .067 .252 .320 .118 .255 .373
Other
Assets .079 1.531 1.610 .21i9 .975 1.21414
Home
Mortgages —.005 .0014 —.001 .073 —.035 .039
Other
Liabilities —.070 1.312 1.2141 —.022 .537F
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